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Abstract—The inability of organizations to put in place 
management control measures for Internet of Things (IoT) 
complexities persists to be a risk concern. Policy makers have been left 
to scamper in finding measures to combat these security and privacy 
concerns. IoT forensics is a cumbersome process as there is no 
standardization of the IoT products, no or limited historical data is 
stored on the devices and them being always connected makes them 
extremely volatile. This paper highlights why IoT forensics is a unique 
adventure and brought out the legal challenges encountered in the 
investigation process. A quadrant model is presented to study the 
conflicting aspects in IoT forensics. The model analyses the 
effectiveness of forensic investigation process versus the admissibility 
of the evidence integrity; taking into account the user privacy and the 
providers’ compliance with the laws and regulations. Our analysis 
concludes that a semi-automated forensic process using machine 
learning, could eliminate the human factor from the profiling and 
surveillance processes, and hence resolves the issues of data protection 
(privacy and confidentiality). 
 
Keywords—cloud forensics, data protection laws, GDPR, IoT 
forensics, machine learning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) era and the 
ever-advancing technology in nearly all the digital gadgets 
indicates that the digital forensics domain is reaching a tipping 
point. The traditional forensic tools that worked are 
increasingly becoming obsolete [1]. More complex reverse 
engineering techniques are required as forensically relevant 
data is being stored in proprietary file formats. Users and 
criminals alike are splitting and storing data in the cloud 
bringing with it legal challenges (privacy and confidentiality 
rights) which limit the amount of data investigators can gain 
access to [2]. 
The forensics process in an IoT environment is complex. 
The IoT devices themselves are a challenge in the forensic 
realm as there are many different devices in the market [3], what 
makes it even more cumbersome is the lack of standardization 
for IoT devices. The data stored on the devices could be so little 
and of no historical or evidential value. The IoT devices are 
always connected which makes them more volatile [2]. This 
adds an extra layer of complexity in the forensic process. 
Privacy is also a key element in maintaining the confidentiality 
of data as it may lead to exposure of personal identified 
information [4]. 
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Furthermore, [5] mentioned accountability as one of the 
IoT forensics challenges. The authors stress that this is because 
different entities manage the composition and the interactions 
between the IoT components. This is further argued by the 
authors that IoT technology is opaque due to the over usage of 
the IoT components thereby behaving in ways that vary from 
the original intention. Another key challenging aspect brought 
out by the authors is that the ownership, management and 
operation of IoT components is done by people or companies 
that may be of diverse geographical locations governed by their 
own native laws and regulations. 
The integration of IoT devices brings with it the 
challenges related to security more so as highlighted by [6]. The 
authors note that confidentiality and integrity compromise is a 
key security and forensics hindrance. The need to assure the 
user that only authorised parties get access to the data is an 
issue. There is compromise of data integrity if unauthorised 
access is gained to the data.  
To differentiate between Digital Forensics and IoT 
Forensics, a clear definition and understanding of an IoT 
environment is required. According to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) by [7] on IoT Cybersecurity 
Colloquium, it is noted that there is no common agreement on 
the definition of IoT. One definition from this NIST publication 
described IoT as things like sensors and devices (excluding 
computers, smartphones and tablets) that are connected through 
the internet to communicate and/or transmit data with or 
between themselves. Another definition refers to IoT as devices 
or things that are not fully operational computers, instead they 
are built for a specific purpose containing sensors which enable 
them to communicate through the internet. Another definition 
proposed by [8] IoT is defined as connecting smart devices like 
sensors to a network through the internet. 
There are several attempts acquainting IoT, however they 
are generic or broad, which may not reflect the actual meaning 
of IoT. In this paper we consider things as devices (for example; 
agents, sensors, and actuators) that can communicate, detect 
and/or measure data with very limited or no processing power. 
Therefore, we define IoT as pervasive connected devices 
through the internet that collect, detect and/or measure data. We 
refer to things with very limited human control, although it 
could be manageable and/or configurable. Things could be 
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classified based on their functionality, there are some things 
that can process data, while other things can detect and/or 
measure data and perhaps several others just observing 
(monitoring) data motion. 
IoT forensics can be defined as a branch of digital 
forensics that combines three levels namely; device level 
forensics, network level forensics and cloud level forensics. 
This is explained further by [9] who stated that IoT forensics 
involves the investigation of IoT infrastructure (device, 
network and cloud). This whereby local memories of IoT 
devices could be investigated for potential evidence, network 
log files could be retrieved to reveal user activities and the cloud 
being a major storage of IoT device data could be a source of 
potential evidence. 
The key players in the IoT forensic investigations are the 
Law enforcement agencies, IoT manufacturers, IoT users (these 
might be the suspects in a case) and the digital investigator (this 
could fall under law enforcement agency). These parties 
involved in the IoT forensics have different accountability and 
responsibilities. There are conflicting interests that emanate 
during the forensic process to apportion liabilities and 
obligations. The users have a right to privacy and 
confidentiality of their data that must be upheld. The law 
enforcement agencies in their pursuit for keeping the internet 
world safe, may use means like profiling and surveillance that 
may infringe on user privacy rights.  
Most researches on how IoT relates to digital forensics is 
argued by [3] as being more theoretical than practical. There is 
a need to study and link the conflicting aspects of IoT forensics 
to identify potential practical solutions that overcome the 
challenges.  
 The aim of this paper is to review the current legal and 
technical challenges of IoT forensics by devising a quadrant 
model that links conflicting aspects in IoT forensics and 
recommending potential ways to bridge the challenges related 
to data protection laws and privacy. 
The main contributions of this paper are: i) the emphasis 
of the uniqueness of IoT forensics, ii) the use of a quadrant 
model to expose conflicting aspects in IoT forensics process, 
and finally, iii) propose the application of machine learning 
techniques to semi-automate the IoT forensic process for 
profiling and surveillance. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
focusses on what makes IoT forensics unique. Key features 
related to IoT forensics are discussed and a summary of 
differences between traditional digital forensics and IoT 
forensics is presented. Section 3 looks at the legal implications 
in IoT forensics; the issue related to accountability is discussed. 
This involves regulation of personal data and legal obligations 
and liabilities. Section 4 expounds on the personal data in IoT 
by defining what personal data is, the parties responsible for 
personal data and the rights that users have regarding personal 
data. Section 5 highlights the technological approach of the 
research and explains that technology can be used as a tool to 
control and audit the forensic process. In Section 6, the quadrant 
model is introduced and applied to bridge the conflicting 
aspects of IoT forensics and to recommend and justify the use 
of Machine Learning to give assurance to the users on privacy 
concerns. Section 7 looks at the future work and finally the 
paper is concluded in Section 8.  
II. WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT IOT FORENSICS? 
Forensics of IoT is still in its infancy as noted by [10]. The 
authors highlight that even though researchers have been 
attracted to this field, current Digital Forensics tools and 
techniques are not well equipped to handle the heterogeneous 
and distributed nature of the IoT setup. This has posed a 
challenge to the digital investigators and law enforcement 
agencies in the investigation process that can gather, examine 
and analyze potential evidence from IoT platforms and present 
evidence that is admissible in a court of law. 
Generally, conventional digital forensics scenarios include 
tangible devices such as personal computers (PC), mobile 
phones and tablets that contain data of potential evidence. In an 
IoT setup, there is a significant change in the sources of 
evidence as there is increased number and types of devices of 
interest that are intangible due to different location sites, and 
the distributed nature of IoT, where the potential evidence may 
be stored on the cloud.   
It is argued by [11] that the cloud, due to its convenience, 
scalability and on demand accessibility plays a fundamental 
role in an IoT forensics. The author states that with the inclusion 
of the cloud, the issues related to redistribution in different 
locations and multi-tenancy make IoT forensics different. 
It is observed by [12] that in traditional digital forensics, the 
investigators use accepted methodologies that follow the 
standards, guidelines and principles provided by widely 
recognized bodies like; Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) and Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 
(SWGDE).  The authors note that in an IoT setup, these 
methodologies may be limited due to the increased scope of IoT 
crimes. Recently, [13] emphasized on the privacy rights 
enshrined in the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) which make IoT forensics further interesting. This is 
because, IoT devices and their (IoT) services have a tendency 
of collecting, sharing and storing huge volumes of data that 
contains personal data that is of varied types. However, it can 
be noted that the personal data generated from IoT devices is 
unstructured and could be spoofed which makes the forensic 
process very challenging. 
In a forensic investigation, search and seizure is a very 
important step. It is argued by [14] that whereas search and 
seizure can be easily achieved in a traditional digital forensics 
investigation, it becomes a challenge in IoT forensics and IoT 
devices are configured to work passively and autonomously. 
Additionally, [15] note that even though the identification of an 
IoT device can be done, there may be no well recognized 
methods or tools that can help a forensically sound process of 
collecting residual evidences from the IoT device. 
  
Moreover, [16] observe that even though there could be a few 
methods that could be used to create forensic images of IoT 
devices, these methods do not adhere to the ethical 
considerations when  evidence is being collected from the 
devices that are run in an environment which has multi-tenancy. 
These authors continue and state that while collected data could 
be preserved using the current techniques like hashing, the 
challenge in IoT setup comes in the preservation of the digital 
forensic crime scene. Different IoT nodes could still have real 
time and autonomous communication thereby making it hard to 
fully locate the crime scene that has been compromised. 
Traditional digital forensics techniques could be used to 
acquire and analyse some IoT devices, there still exists a 
challenge of these devices possessing vendor specific software, 
different file systems structures and diversity of communication 
protocols that add complexity [3]. 
Another challenge mentioned by [17], is that many IoT 
devices do not store metadata that includes temporal 
information such as timestamps. 
A summary of the characteristics that make IoT forensics 
different from other traditional digital forensics are as follows:  
• More challenging due to the immense growth of 
IoT devices and their distributed nature, 
• The IoT devices are heterogeneous in nature and 
require specialized tools to retrieve data, 
• Existing IoT devices could be resource 
constrained, 
• The data collected is huge and diversified, this 
brings complication in the forensic process,   
• The proprietary protocols, laws and regulations 
for implementation are widely spread and not 
standardised. 
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN IOT FORENSICS 
It is noted by [18] that the lack of universal rules and 
regulations coupled with standards and protocols will hinder 
IoT from being integrated in various organizational networks. 
Due to the continued use of IoT devices, there has been a rise 
in the creation of new regulations. 
The collected data from IoT devices can be misused in a 
discriminatory way that goes against the user privacy, it is 
therefore upon the organizations who hold this data to ensure 
that only authorized access is granted. The inability of 
organizations to put in place management control measures for 
Internet of Things (IoT) complexities persists to be a risk 
concern. Policy makers have been left to scamper in finding 
measures to combat these security and privacy concerns. 
The nature of the law is complex with many layers and is 
distributed across different domains meaning that there are 
different interpretations and application to people impacted. It 
therefore follows that it is difficult to assign accountability due 
to the complexity of IoT and the different interpretation of the 
law.  
The independence of location of the cloud is a challenge. 
This is noted by [19] who state that the use of IoT devices, some 
of which are highly portable coupled with complex supply 
chains may exhibit challenges especially in determining which 
country’s laws to use to apportion rights and liabilities. 
The challenging accountability aspects in IoT environment 
as identified by [5] are; governance and responsibility, privacy 
and surveillance, and safety and security  
In IoT regulations, we have brought out two areas of 
significance, these are legal obligations and liabilities, and 
regulation of personal data. 
A. Obligation and Liability 
For a forensic process to run smoothly, full disclosure and 
transparency is of utmost importance. Accountability can 
therefore only be apportioned if the manufacturers of IoT 
systems are transparent about the workings of the system. It is 
stated by [2] that it is within the law for a technology 
manufacturer whose service leads to a loss or injury to 
demonstrate that the actions taken were reasonable or fair, 
failure to which, the manufacturer faces liability. 
It would be reasonable to eliminate the human element by 
implementing a machine learning algorithm to be run on the 
data and produce a report which is only to be accessed by 
authorised parties. However, as this approach may be 
acceptable by the law enforcement agencies, it may not be 
acceptable to both the suspects (data owner) and the Cloud 
Service Providers (CSP). There must be assurance of 
confidentiality and integrity to the data owners that their data is 
safe and the CSPs do also need assurance that their cloud 
service infrastructure is not compromised.  
Transparency obligations are enshrined in the data-protection 
law to data subjects and regulators. When forensically assessing 
liability, user’s liability is mostly based on negligence where no 
reasonable actions were taken to avert likely risks. Users are 
expected to be aware of the workings of a particular IoT device 
before using. Manufacturers are not obliged by law to explain 
how the developed technology works other than to keep up with 
the data protections requirements [2]. 
B. Privacy and Data Protection 
The data protection laws, as emphasised by [5],  are 
underpinned by basic principles   which are; being fair, 
legitimate processing, being limited to the purpose , being 
accurate, data minimization, storage limitation , integrity, and 
confidentiality. 
The European Union (EU) General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) articles have a key principle of EU data 
protection law which stipulates that the processing of personal 
data should be done in a manner that is lawful, fair and 
transparent. As required and emphasized in the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidelines, the forensic process 
must be conducted in a manner that should create audit trails 
that can be accessed by a third party and achieve the same 
results. 
It is challenging to apply data protection rules on user data 
because technologies that generate and produce individual data 
have evolved dramatically with the ever growing IoT 
environment. It can be observed that almost all data is seen as 
  
personal data with strict rules governing personal data more so 
of special interest categories. 
It is also difficult to apportion liability due to the dynamic 
supply chain of IoT which is multi-layered with multiparty 
ownership that could be spread across many geographical 
locations with different regulations of operations. 
IV. PERSONAL DATA IN IOT 
The emergence of IoT has resulted in major concerns 
related to privacy, security, trust and governance.  These 
concerns are unsurprising as they have been deemed as 
the potential greatest hinderance to adoption of IoT. The 
capability of IoT devices like CCTV to capture data that is 
not necessarily of the owner of the device but any other 
person in the vicinity without their knowledge is a breach 
of privacy [19]. 
It is noted by [20] that many issues related to the 
privacy and data protection have arisen from cloud 
services which includes government agencies accessing 
people’s private data illegally. The other issue arising 
from privacy and data protection is the use of personal 
data for inappropriate purposes like 
profiling/discrimination [21] 
It should be noted that huge volumes of data are 
collected by IoT devices, in most cases this collection is 
done without the knowledge of the IoT device users. The 
level of knowledge of these users of how their data is 
collected and used is very limited to enable them give free 
and informed consent. 
A. What personal data is regulated? 
Personal data is any data that relates to an 
identifiable living individual. This data is protected 
under the data protection laws. The identification of a 
natural person can be done both directly or indirectly 
through identifiers like their names, number of 
identification (ID number), data related to their 
geographical location, and or their online identity 
through their IP addresses. Although still personal, data 
can be pseudonymised (remove identifiers or replace) to 
help in the reduction of privacy risks which makes it hard 
to identify individuals. It should, however, be noted that 
GDPR does not cover information relating to institutions, 
foundations and corporations which are legal entities 
because their data is not personal data. Privacy rights can 
be referred to as the right to one’s personality.  
The EU GDPR data protection laws stipulate that the 
storing or accessing of personal data of a user held by an 
organization must only be consented to by the user. This 
therefore means that the user has to give consent for any 
action on their data. Article 8 of the EU GDPR in 
particular covers many rights related to the protection of 
personal data [22].  
B. Who is responsible for personal data? 
Controllers control the purpose and how the data is 
processed under the EU data protection laws. The 
controllers are therefore primarily responsible and liable 
to comply with the laws. In instances where data is 
processed by third parties on behalf of controllers, the 
third parties must abide by the regulations. In most 
scenarios, it is observed that the service providers are the 
controllers and processors of personal data. 
The EU GDPR regulations have introduced huge 
fines for breach of user data privacy. There is direct 
obligation and liabilities to controllers and processors of 
personal data with those who breach security obligations 
being fined amounts not exceeding 20 million Euros or 
4% of total annual turnover, whichever is higher [23]. 
Apportioning this liability during the IoT forensics 
process may be difficult to implement. This is due to 
many players involved and the complex supply chain 
which makes identification of players very hard. 
C. What rights do IoT users have? 
The rights of IoT users correspond to the obligations 
that controller must abide by when they process users’ 
personal data. In the event of damages caused due to 
unlawful processing of their data, the users have a right 
to seek compensation. They have rights to access their 
personal data, refusal for their data to be processed in 
relation to decision making that are automated. Users can 
consent for their data to be processed or if the controller 
has a legal justification to process the data for legitimate 
purposes. However, under the EU GDPR regulations, 
conditions for valid consent may be strict because the 
consent has to be given freely by the user [19].  
The EU GDPR regulations Article 21 gives the user 
the right to object. This means that, without user consent 
to process the personal data. data controllers must 
provide and demonstrate compelling legitimate reasons 
that override those of the users. This regulation is vague 
because even the very definition of compelling reasons is 
not provided leaving a vacuum as to how to distinguish 
between a legitimate compelling reason and an 
illegitimate one.  
Article 22 of the EU GDPR data protection laws gives 
a user the right to choose whether or not to go through 
individual decision-making processes that are automated 
(e.g, profiling). This is also another unclear area because 
data controllers find it difficult in handling objections 
because they are forced to cease provision of all services.  
This leads to a situation where the users who are more 
  
concerned about privacy of their data are left with the 
option of either taking up the service or leaving it 
altogether [13]. 
Under the GDPR laws, data controller and 
processors have an obligation to inform the users of how 
the collection, usage, disclosure and storage of their 
personal information is carried out and how the users 
may exercise their rights over that data. A report from the 
UK’s privacy regulator - Information Commissioner’s 
Office [24] indicates that out of ten controllers of IoT, six 
don’t adequately inform their customers on the usage of 
their personal data. 
The report showed that:  
i) Of the analysed devices, 59 per cent of them 
failed to sufficiently inform the user of how the 
collection, usage and disclosure of their personal 
data was being done; 
ii) On the issues of storage, 68 per cent of the devices 
did not show how the data was being stored; 
iii) On the user’s right to be forgotten online, 72 per 
cent of the devices could not explain how a user 
could erase all their data from the devices 
iv) And finally, 38 per cent of the devices did not 
have contact information that a customer could 
contact in case they had concerns related to 
privacy of their data. 
There were concerns raised relating to medical 
devices used by General Practitioners (GPs). Although 
these devices sent encrypted emails back to GPs, there 
were issues infringement of data protection laws as 
follows: 
• Through the IoT device, control is lost in the 
processing of data; 
• The quality of users’ consent is undermined as is 
it difficult to get it; 
• The users risk losing the whole package of 
services from IoT service providers if they don’t 
give consent for processing of their data in a 
particular way 
• The original purpose for the processing of the 
data is possible abused as it may be processed 
more than required; 
• The transmission of the personal data is at a high 
risk as the medium used may be prone to hackers 
who may steal the data; 
• The data collected may be used in ways that were 
not initially intended because it collected from 
varied devices from different sources. 
V. TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH 
It is noted by [5] that although technology is not a 
cure all solution in solving accountability issues in IoT 
forensics, it can be used to complement all the other 
aspects to enable come up with proper rules, regulations 
and standards. To better align this thought, the authors 
have suggested that technical means will help in: 
A. Control 
This entails what the determination of what happens 
through a process that has active steps detailing how 
obligations and exercise of rights are met. 
B. Auditing 
Auditing will make visible what happens or what 
happened. This will be illustrated by proving evidence 
explaining the operations of the system, actions and the 
recourse thereof. It is at auditing that digital forensics 
plays a major role in revealing what transpired in an 
event of loss of data, data breach or damages. 
Control and audit augment the accountability 
considerations. The auditing will increase transparency 
in the IoT systems giving rise to informed decision 
making by users and provide evidence that can be very 
useful in investigation processes to apportion liability [5]. 
VI. QUADRANT MODEL 
To aid this paper further, a quadrant model 
developed by [25] was used to help understand different 
scenarios at play in IoT forensics and propose a solution 
to the privacy, confidentiality and data integrity for a 
sound  IoT  forensic investigation process. 
A quadrant model tries to complement conflicting 
elements in a social phenomenon. It relates to how 
different aspects ranging from law to social norms affect 
those involved. In most cases, these aspects are acceptable 
and effective, some aspects might be unacceptable but 
effective, others may be acceptable but ineffective and 
lastly aspects may be unacceptable and ineffective. 
This paper uses this quadrant model and equates the 
acceptable and unacceptable elements to admissible and 
inadmissible (in a court of law) respectively as illustrated 
below in Fig. 1 Quadrant Model. 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1 Quadrant Model 
 
Quadrant 1 indicates actions that are effective and legally 
acceptable to all parties involved. These elements are compliant 
with the laws and therefore lead to an admissible report in a 
court of law. These can be for example, auditing and control, 
safety and security, confidentiality and privacy, data protection, 
and transparency. 
Quadrant 2 is the problem area, consists of actions that are 
effective in increasing efficiency, but where parties have 
conflicting views. The activities involved in this quadrant are 
for example the use profiling, surveillance, tapping, 
eavesdropping and cloning among many other inadmissible 
mechanisms. Law enforcement agencies may want to employ 
those mechanisms as a security measure; however, users may 
claim that their privacy is encroached, data being accessed by 
unauthorized entities. This may lead to issues related to legal 
obligations and liability between IoT users and IoT 
manufacturers. 
Quadrant 3 consists of actions that are generally inadmissible 
in a court of law and at the same time ineffective. For these 
reasons, this quadrant will be ignored as it is unproductive 
Quadrant 4 are actions which are admissible in a court of law 
but do not contribute to increased efficiency. These elements 
are not admissible in a court of law.  These actions can be for 
example, regulators banning some IoT devices and enforcing 
licensing for IoT devices. These actions, although admissible, 
they may be hard to implement meaning that they will be so 
ineffective and unproductive. This paper ignores the actions in 
this quadrant. 
A. The Quadrant Model in Context 
As the quadrant model is to complement conflicting aspects or 
interests, it is evident from this paper that the conflicting parties 
in an IoT forensic investigation process are the users of IoT, 
manufacturers of IoT platforms, IoT service providers and Law 
enforcement agencies. All these parties have conflicting 
interests in that, whereas the law enforcement agencies may 
want to do profiling and surveillance on user activities, they are 
restricted by law as it is an infringement to the privacy and 
confidentiality of the user.  
IoT Service Providers and IoT manufactures alike may also 
install backdoor applications onto IoT devices to snoop on user 
activities and in most cases collect users’ private data for 
marketing purposes. The IoT Services Providers and 
manufacturers deny this wrongdoing whenever an investigation 
comes up. They blame users of negligence and would not also 
allow forensic investigators get to underlying structure of the 
technology used their devices even though they are expected to 
be transparent in their undertakings. 
These conflicting aspects or interests put in context complicate 
the IoT forensic investigation process. 
In the digital forensics’ domain, forensic investigators are 
required to carry out their investigative process in a manner that 
is legally acceptable/admissible. The law enforcement agencies 
are also required to work within a specified terrain of 
regulations. All these activities are to be done without 
infringing the rights of a suspect. 
This paper therefore uses the quadrant model to find reasons as 
to why and how the inadmissible but effective actions can be 
made effective and admissible in a court of law. Particularly, 
this is to show cause why profiling can be acceptable by the 
user and be effective to the law enforcement agencies and be 
admissible in a court of law, as illustrated in Fig. 2 Profiling 
and Surveillance in IoT ForensicsError! Reference source not 
found. below. 
 
  
 
Fig. 2 Profiling and Surveillance in IoT Forensics
B. Profiling and Surveillance in IoT Forensics 
Profiling and surveillance are useful means (when used 
lawfully) through which law enforcement agencies can use to 
detect any security threats that are posed by IoT gadgets. As 
earlier highlighted in this paper, IoT data is transmitted to the 
cloud. The cloud therefore serves as a platform through which 
a profiling or a surveillance mechanism can be deployed for 
profiling and surveillance to give alerts or reports. This paper 
proposes the use of Machine Learning algorithm as to 
implement this mechanism. 
C. Why Machine Learning for Profiling and Surveillance? 
As explained by [26] and [27], with experience, Machine 
Learning programs have the capability to improve 
automatically and learn without being explicitly programmed. 
The use of Machine Learning for profiling and surveillance is 
to eliminate the human factor and give the owner of the data the 
confidence for their privacy and confidentiality, thereby only 
ensuring only authorized access of the data is gained. 
The human decision making as observed by [28] is in most 
cases influenced by behaviours like stereotyping and prejudice. 
Some people make decisions based on the characteristics of 
profiles they perceive. This may distort evidence as it may be 
inaccurate, incomplete or none thereof because it may be 
wholly derived from stereotype and prejudice [29]. 
Machine Learning being a science that consists of algorithms 
that can detect patterns in data and as highlighted by [30], 
different profiles of individuals can be created through 
probabilistic processing of their personal by use of Machine 
Learning. This paper argues that Machine Learning algorithms 
can be deemed appropriate to be used in profiling and 
surveillance.  
It is also noted by [2] that profiles only represent a version of 
reality which in some cases may not be the exact reality which 
is created from a process of data mining that includes 
algorithms and data used in the process. 
VII. FUTURE WORK 
The future work from this paper is to design a Machine 
Learning algorithm that can be implemented in the cloud for 
profiling and surveillance and as a forensics tool to semi-
automate the process of investigation and eliminate a situation 
where decisions making processes are only based on human 
beings. 
To investigate ways in which all the standards, rules and 
regulations related to IoT forensics can be formalised and 
standardised to aid in the investigative process. 
It is also desirable to carry out an in-depth analysis of the EU 
GDPR rules and how these laws relate to the use of Machine 
Learning algorithms in the process of decision making that is 
automated and the effects it has on users and the final 
judgement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Plethora of digital things is encircling our world and shaping 
our life, they took their place in the harmonious complexity of 
the world. These things are connected pervasively through the 
internet in a very complex structure which may cause many 
challenges.  
This paper highlights the need for more advanced mechanisms 
for handling IoT and cloud forensics. This area is multi-layered 
and complicated as it has many players and needs more 
cooperation between parties involved. 
The laws and regulations in place further make it a bit hard for 
law enforcement and forensic investigators to carry out their 
work as the issues of privacy and confidentiality come in to 
play. The lack of comprehensive, widely accepted international 
standards, rules and regulations to manage the IoT and cloud 
security are a big concern. as we continue to witness more 
complexity in IoT technologies with no laws to govern.  
A concerted effort between multi-disciplined experts should be 
mooted to consolidate the main areas of conflicts and provide 
viable solutions for long term security measures. These efforts 
should consider the development of unconventional digital 
forensic technologies to improve the effectiveness of the whole 
investigation process as well as to increase the degree of the 
acceptance of the parties involved in the IoT forensic process. 
Law enforcement agencies should carry out public awareness 
forums (using any reasonable medium) and educate the general 
public on the responsibilities they have to ensure they are safe 
online. Many IoT users fall prey to security scams because they 
are ignorant or negligent. 
Whereas Machine Learning algorithms can be deemed 
resourceful in generating timely and accurate reports, it should 
be noted EU GDPR regulations state that the final decision on 
  
a person’s character should not be made solely relying on the 
automated process that violates the person’s interests.  
Overall, it should be noted that using semi-automated decision-
making process especially that of Machine Learning algorithms 
in profiling and surveillance is a sure bet of eliminating human 
elements that bring with them discrimination, stereotypes and 
prejudices. 
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